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1 The Comparison: Bossism in
Thailand and The Philippines
Every modern state commands 'public' agencies,
resources, and regulatory powers that may be
appropriated for 'private' gain. The formal rules
governing the distinction between 'public' and 'pri-
vate' interests (and their violation or manipulation)
serve as the basis for what is commonly identified
as 'corruption'. Yet 'corruption' is a phenomenon
notoriously difficult to document, to quantify, and
thus to compare systematically over time or across
cases. Where the structure of 'corruption' mani-
fests itself in publicly visible and enduring forms of
monopoly, however, greater clarity is possible.
Thus, in the case of Indonesia, for example, schol-
ars have amply documented, sector by sector, the
monopolistic control over the 'commanding
heights' of the economy secured by cronies and
children of long-time president Suharto, thus high-
lighting the 'neo-patrimonial' features of his
regime.
In formally democratic regimes, moreover, the
entrenchment of numerous local 'bosses' provides
an analogous form of monopoly, which, however
localized, may be similarly chronicled in newspa-
per articles, court cases, election records, other
public documents, and provincial histories. Hence
the considerable scholarly literature on county
court house cliques and urban machines in the
United States, mafia in southern Italy, caciques in
Latin America.
This essay seeks to identify the political context
of corruption in Thailand and the Philippines by
tracing the emergence of a social formation in
which virtual monopolies over coercive and eco-
nomic resources within territorially defined baili-
wicks are secured and maintained by local 'bosses'.
Through a comparative historical analysis of state
formation in South East Asia, the essay illustrates
the centrality of 'democratization' - the subordina-
tion of the state apparatus to elected officials - in
facilitating the growth of 'bossism' in Thailand and
the Philippines, and not elsewhere in the region.
Through a comparative sociological analysis of
state and institutional structures, moreover, the
essay highlights those factors that best explain
variation in the manifestations of bossism seen
across cases and over time.
In a region well known for its diversity of linguistic
and cultural influences, 'Great Tradition' religions,
colonial experiences, ethnic and class configura-
tions, and state and institutional structures,
Thailand and the Philippines stand out as particu-
larly unlikely and unpromising candidates for
cross-national comparative analysis. Despite their
many differences in terms of historical experience
and socio-political configuration, however, they
share a set of important commonalities that make
them distinctive in the South East Asian context
and make a 'paired comparison' plausible and
promising. First of all, in the era of high colonial-
ism (c. 1850-1940), while ethnically segmented
'plural societies' crystallized elsewhere in the
region, Siam and the Philippines provided unparal-
leled opportunities for the assimilation and upward
social mobility of Chinese immigrants and their
Sino-Thai/Chinese mestizo offspring. Second, in the
postwar era of capitalist industrialization, predomi-
nantly Chinese and Sino-ThailChinese mestizo
business elites have risen to prominence in the cul-
tural, economic, and political fields. This provides
a sharp contrast with Indonesia and Malaysia where
these groups have been constrained by 'pariah
entrepreneur' status and subjected to the predations
of 'indigenous' (pribumi/bumiputra) military officers,
politicians, and their children and cronies. Third,
only in Thailand and the Philippines have such
self-conscious and self-confident business elites
succeeded in institutionalizing the trappings of
bourgeois democracy: a state apparatus firmly sub-
ordinated to elected officials, a schedule of regular
and competitive elections, a familiar set of recog-
nized civil liberties, and a free and lively press.
Fourth, democratic institutions in both countries
have not encouraged the emergence of major polit-
ical parties or social movements fighting for radical
social change. Rather, the (re)establishment of
democratic institutions since the mid-1980s has
given rise to comparable forms of 'bossism': a social
formation in which local powerbrokers achieve
sustained, monopolistic control over coercive and
economic resources within territorially delineated
bailiwicks.
This article focuses on the manifestations of
bossism observed in Thailand and the Philippines
over the past ten years of democratization and seeks
to set the phenomenon within a broader historical
context. We argue that the recent growth of
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bossism in both Thailand and the Philippines
reflects a common conjuncture in state formation
and capitalist development: the decisive subordi-
nation of the state apparatus to elected officials
against the backdrop of what might loosely be
termed 'primitive accumulation'. By 'primitive
accumulation', we refer to a phase of capitalist
development in which (i) a significant section of
the population has lost direct control over the
means of production and direct access to means
of subsistence, and been reduced to a state of
economic insecurity and dependence on scarce
wage labour (i.e. prior to the achievement of 'full'
employment and modem welfare capitalism); and
(ii) considerable economic resources and preroga-
tives remain in the 'public' domain and secure (pri-
vate) property rights have not yet been firmly
established by the state. Taken together, these last
two conditions signal both the susceptibility of
many voters to clientelistic, coercive, and monetary
pressures and the centrality of state-based resources
and prerogatives for capital accumulation and
control over the 'commanding heights' of local
economies.
Compared to the centralized authoritarian regimes
found elsewhere in South East Asia, where 'monop-
oly rents' and 'protection rents' circulate among
dominant party members, state functionaries, mili-
tary officers, and presidential (or prime ministerial)
family members and friends, bossism in contempo-
rary Thailand and the Philippines reflects the
decentring of 'rent-seeking opportunities' away
from the national capital and the central state
apparatus and towards province, district, and town,
private capitalists, gangsters, and 'political entrepre-
neurs'. A comparative analysis of the diverging pat-
terns of local bossism found in Thailand and the
Philippines since the mid-1980s highlights the
importance of both state formation and the timing
of 'democratization' relative to capitalist develop-
ment for explaining variations in this social phe-
nomenon in the two countries. The remainder of
this brief essay sets the historical context and traces
both the consequences of 'democratization' in the
1980s, and the effects of ongoing processes of cap-
italist development today, for the emergence and
durability of bossism in Thailand and the
Philippines.
2 Thailand: From Bureaucratic
Polity to Bossism
In striking contrast with the state-making 'patch-
work' of the Western colonial powers elsewhere in
South East Asia, the incorporation of the dynastic
realm known as Siam into the world economy from
the mid-nineteenth century saw the emergence of a
centralized bureaucracy virtually unencumbered by
concessions to localized forces of socio-linguistic
diversity and residual aristocratic privilege
Following the coup d'etat of 1932, control over this
apparatus of provincial administration shifted from
the hands of absolutizing monarchs and, in the
post-war era, passed to avowedly anti-communist
and 'development'-orientated military officers, in
what came to be known as a well-insulated (if inter-
nally factionalized) 'bureaucratic polity'.
In this context, the institutional constraints upon
embryonic manifestations of local bossism were sig-
nificant. The steady growth of rice cultivation pro-
vided ample opportunities for capital accumulation
through control over the expanding circuitries of
production and distribution, and a provincial eco-
nomic elite accordingly emerged, based in
landownership, moneylending, milling, marketing,
and transportation as well as such illegal activities
as gambling and smuggling. At the local level,
moreover, the election of lifetime village headmen
and, for groupings of several villages, commune
headmen allowed small-town businessmen to exer-
cise a measure of influence over the flow of central
government patronage. A pattern of what James C.
Scott (1972) has identified as 'market corruption'
thrived, with pliable and predatory local agents of
various central government ministries open to the
'purchase' of their discretionary and regulatory
powers over the local economy Yet these local gov-
ernment officials were only available, as it were, for
temporary rent rather than permanent sale, and at
prices to a considerable extent dictated by compet-
itive bidding, as decisions with regard to appoint-
ment, promotion, removal, and transfer were made
by Bangkok-based bureaucrats rather than up-
country bosses. At the national level, an analogous
pattern persisted, with the dominant banking
empires obliged to include ranking army generals
on their boards of directors, and the syndicates
For scholarly accounts, see Anderson, Ockey 1992;
Phongpaichit et al. 1994 and Turton 1989.
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running the opium and heroin trade operated by
rival cliques within the military establishment.
By the 1970s, however, three interrelated (and well-
documented') changes had begun to expand the
domain for local bossism in Thailand. First of all, a
pattern of steady economic growth, stimulated in
no small part by the American-sponsored Vietnam
War boom in the country, greatly expanded and
multiplied the activities, resources, and external
linkages of provincial elites in the Thai countryside.
Owners of paddy fields and rice mills rechannelled
capital into gasoline stations and ice plants, mining
claims and logging concessions, construction com-
panies and real-estate firms, and shifted energies
into cultivating Bangkok-based banks for loans and
district- and province-level bureaucrats for building
permits, land titles, public works contracts, zoning
ordinances, and various concessions, franchises,
and regulatory breaks. Second, with the growth of
armed revolutionary movements in neighbouring
Laos and Cambodia and the emergence of peasant-
based organizations and mobilizational efforts in
some areas of the Thai countryside, the government
in Bangkok initiated a counterinsurgency campaign
that entailed both the infusion of considerable state
funds for 'rural development' and the creation of
local paramilitary organizations in rural communi-
ties. These intertwined processes broadened the
scope and volume of resource flows and state-based
prerogatives available to provincial businessmen in
rural Thailand.
Third, the social forces generated by the Vietnam
War boom began to combine with the internal con-
tradictions of army rule to shift the locus of
national-level power away from the military estab-
lishment and towards previously ceremonial and
impotent parliamentary institutions. Whilst an ini-
tial period of unprecedented opennness in 1973-
1976 led to a harsh right-wing backlash against the
most vocal proponents of democratization, the
intensity of factional rivalries at the highest eche-
lons of the army derailed efforts to reconstruct a
military-dominated 'bureaucratic polity' and deliv-
ered increasing political leverage and legislative
authority into the hands of parliament. Thus,
although an appointed Senate and threats of a coup
d'ètat left considerable power in military hands,
Bangkok's agro-business, banking, commercial and
industrial magnates began to view parliament as an
essential avenue of influence and rechannelled
their resources accordingly Whilst Bangkok-based
magnates commanded tremendous financial
resources, only province-based businessmen
enjoyed links to large blocs of voters in the coun-
try's overwhelmingly rural constituencies, and par-
liamentary seats promised influence over (or
inclusion among) cabinet ministers, central min-
istries, and local agents of the Thai state. With
the vast majority of parliamentary (multiple-seat)
constituencies located in rural areas, it is thus
no surprise that by 1990, nearly half of the mem-
bers of the Cabinet were identified as provincial
businessmen.
Against this backdrop, by the mid-1980s observers
of Thai politics had begun to comment on the
growing manifestations of local bossism, most
prominently with reference to what have come to be
known as chao pho (orjao poh), Thai 'godfathers' of
a distinctly mafioso variety (Ockey 1993). These
chao pho are identifiable through their interrelated
activities in three realms. First, they are visible
through the multiplicity and monopolistic quality
of their economic activities within loosely defined
territorial bailiwicks, in terms of accumulation of
proprietary wealth (agricultural land, real-estate
properties, mills, processing centres, factories;
shares in banks and industrial firms), acquisition of
state-derived concessions, contracts, and franchises
(e.g. logging, mining, public works, transport), and
involvement in illegal rackets (e.g. drug trade, gam-
bling, smuggling). Second, chao pho have achieved
great prominence and power through their suc-
cessful service as - or provision of - vote brokers
(hua khanaen) in elections, delivering parliamentary
constituencies or regional clusters of constituencies
to Bangkok-based patrons, local clients, or them-
selves on election day, through a combination of
coercion, vote-buying, and electoral fraud. Third,
chao pho have become notorious for their control
over local state agencies, most notably the coercive
apparatuses, and their ability to achieve effective
local monopolies over the organization of (state and
extra-state) violence within their bailiwicks, for
use in capital accumulation, electoral manipulation,
and enforcement of illegal rackets.
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Compared to the forms of local bossism observed
elsewhere, the contemporary Thai variant is distinc-
tive in two key respects. First, the transfer of effec-
tive control over the state apparatus to elected
officials came relatively late vis-à-vis the process of
capitalist development, with enormous Bangkok-
based financial, agro-business, and industrial con-
glomerates and up-country magnates with
province- or region-wide empires already en-
trenched and equipped with ample resources for
electoral competition. Thus prominent Bangkok
bankers and industrialists have themselves assumed
political party leadership posts or otherwise engi-
neered alliances with regional clusters of chao pho,
and provincial businessmen have in some cases
exercised chao pho-like influence over multiple con-
stituencies or even provinces. Second, the subordi-
nation of the state apparatus to a parliament drawn
from multiple-seat constituencies and without pro-
portional representation has encouraged a highly
fluid system of political parties held together largely
by patronage networks (regional and national) and
personal ties and coalition governments stitched
together through multi-party Cabinets. Thus chao
pho exercising control over several constituencies
have found it relatively easy to install themselves or
their stooges in Cabinet and thereby to wield con-
siderable influence over the internal affairs of key
central ministries and their local agents.
As suggested by the ascent of up-country construc-
tion magnate and provincial gangster-politician,
Banharn Silpa-archa, to the premiership following
the 1995 elections, the social and institutional con-
straints upon the power and influence of chao pho in
contemporary Thailand are rather limited. The
brief reassertion in 199 1-92 of military prerogatives
was relatively diffident and ultimately disastrous,
proving that the social costs of a full-blown author-
itarian relapse are simply no longer sustainable in
Thailand. Whilst a handful of former army officers
have made the transition to civilian political careers
and secured parliamentary and even cabinet seats,
the military establishment itself today enjoys only
limited institutional autonomy from parliament and
limited economic relevance for businessmen.
Labour unions, peasant groups and non-govern-
ment organizations command very little electoral
influence, and election-monitoring efforts by a
group known as Poll Watch to curb vote-buying,
violence, and electoral fraud do not appear to have
seriously disrupted chao pho methods for mobilizing
rural Thai voters. Meanwhile, the much vaunted
urban middle-class reformism' of the Bangkok-
based Palang Dharma party has evidently fallen
victim to the realities of parliamentary coalition-
making and campaign financing, as signalled by the
assumption of party leadership by a prominent
business tycoon.
In this context, the most effective and important
constraints upon chao pho influence and activities
appear to be those exercised by individual
Bangkok-based and foreign capitalists and by the
structural logic of capitalist development. As vari-
ous (Bangkok-based and foreign) conglomerates
have extended direct control over the production
and distribution of goods and services to the
provinces, chao pho methods of electoral mobiliza-
tion will accordingly grow more costly and face
greater challenges. Such is the promise of 'democ-
ratization', but for the foreseeable future chao pho
will retain if not the premiership then at least a con-
siderable share of seats in parliament, control over
the Cabinet, and discretion over the agencies and
resources of the state apparatus.
3 The Philippines: Bossism,
American-Style
In sharp contrast with Thailand, the incorporation
of the Philippine archipelago into the world econ-
omy in the nineteenth century did not stimulate
serious efforts to create a centralized bureaucracy,
and the imposition of American colonial rule at the
beginning of the twentieth century introduced a
pattern of state formation unique in South East
Asia. Under Spanish colonial rule, local executives
at the settlement and municipal level were elected
under a limited franchise and the supervision of
Spanish parish priests. By the late nineteenth cen-
tury an emerging class of predominantly Chinese
mestizo landowners, merchants, and moneylenders
thus exercised - if not directly, then through rela-
tives or other proxies - a measure of discretion over
local affairs through local elected offices. At the
turn of the century, moreover, the invading
American forces combined a campaign of brutal
repression with a strategy of cooptation in their
efforts to 'pacify' the archipelago, and the rapid
devolution of local authority to elected officials
held obvious attractions to the provincial elites who
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had led the Revolution against the Spaniards and
resistance against the Americans. Thus elections to
municipal office, based on highly restricted suffrage
and freed from the intervention of ecclesiastical
authorities, were first held in 1901, soon followed
by those for provincial governors (1902), represen-
tatives to a national Philippine Assembly (1907), an
American-style bicameral legislature (1916), and,
under a Philippine Constitution and Common-
wealth, a directly elected presidency (1935).
In classic American style, and under the rubric of
rapid 'Filipinization', these elected Filipino officials
enjoyed enormous discretion over the emerging
state apparatus. Elected municipal mayors retained
their Spanish-era discretionary powers over local
law-enforcement, public works, and taxation, wïn-
ning complete independence from parish priests
and full authority to appoint municipal police
forces. Whilst elected governors enjoyed somewhat
similar law-enforcement and taxation powers at the
provincial level, representatives to the national leg-
islature gained control over a hastily constructed
and rapidly 'Filipinized' national state apparatus.
Within their own districts, legislators exercised
effective discretion over the disbursement of 'pork
barrel' funds for public works and the appointment
of constabulary commanders, district engineers and
superintendents of schools, provincial fiscals, trea-
surers, and assessors, judges of the court of first
instance, and local agents of the Bureau of Lands.
In Manila, meanwhile, these legislators likewise
exerted influence over the awarding of contracts,
concessions, and monopoly franchises, the appoint-
ment of officials in national government agencies,
and the allocation of loans by the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Finally, with the election of a
Commonwealth president in 1935, a (directly
elected) national executive took office, assuming
powers in domestic affairs far greater than those of
his American counterpart.
Following Philippine independence in 1946, the
continued subordination of the agencies of the
national state apparatus to this multi-tiered hierar-
chy of elected officials combined with the ongoing
process of 'primitive accumulation' and the expand-
ing economic role of the Philippine state with
import-substitution industrialization to facilitate the
emergence and entrenchment of bosses in numerous
localities and at various levels of state power. The
frequency of elections and the overlapping and
conflicting prerogatives of municipal, provincial,
and congressional authorities have guaranteed con-
tinuous dynamism and exerted competitive pressure
upon aspiring powerbrokers, yet bosses have been
able to construct and through persistent electoral
victories retain personal fiefdoms through the
accumulation of economic and coercive resources
within a given bailiwick. In some localities, a con-
centration of land or other forms of proprietary
wealth has facilitated the entrenchment of dynasties
over successive generations; in others, the extent of
state control over the 'commanding heights' of the
local economy has permitted long-term rule by a
single boss but thwarted efforts at dynasty-building.
In still other localities, boss rule has entailed the
delivery of 'brokerage' services to a cartel of local
business magnates. Throughout, the key to boss rule
has lain in the accumulation and retention of a pre-
ponderant share of the key resources for local elec-
toral success: a retinue of loyal personal followers,
large quantities of money for buying votes and brib-
ing election officials, and coercive resources to rein-
force both personal and pecuniary considerations.
Thus bosses have succeeded in entrenching them-
selves in various localities throughout the archipel-
ago and at all levels of state power. In countless
small towns, claims to rice fields, coconut groves,
and sugar plantations, control of agricultural credit,
distribution, input, and processing networks, and
command over municipal lands, mangroves, and
fishing grounds, law-enforcement, patronage, pub-
lic works, and rackets have combined to sustain the
electoral and economic fortunes of numerous
perennial mayors. At the congressional district and
provincial levels, long-time congressmen and gov-
ernors have relied more heavily on state office to
control 'nodal' economic choke-points and key nat-
ural resources: sugar centrals and cement factories
built up with PNB behest loans, electricity and
transportation companies awarded franchises, con-
struction and real-estate firms offered preference in
contract bidding and zoning ordinances, logging
and mining concessions provided on public lands.
With municipal and provincial law-enforcement
agencies subordinated to mayoral and gubernatorial
control, moreover, 'provincial warlords' have
enjoyed control over so-called 'private armies' as
well as lucrative rackets in gambling, smuggling,
and other illegal activities.
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Whilst bosses have flourished in numerous munic-
ipalities, congressional districts, and provinces, the
distinctive institutional structures of the Philippine
state and the pattern of private capital formation
in the archipelago have obstructed the ascension
of boss rule to the national (i.e. presidential) level.
Alongside the American-style single-district/single-
representative House of Representatives, the bicam-
eral national legislature has included a Senate
whose 24 members are elected on a nation-wide
basis. With its manifold patronage powers en-
shrined in the Constitution and its 24 members
proven in the national electoral arena, the Senate
has often served as an effective Trojan horse and
launching pad for anti-administration opposition
forces and campaigns against the re-election bids of
presidential incumbents, thus preventing the
entrenchment of national bosses. Furthermore, the
national oligarchy has reinforced this pattern of fac-
tional competition for the presidency and thwarted
national state-based monopoly, by providing gener-
ous funding to opposition candidates and prevent-
ing the 'commanding heights' of the national
economy from falling into the hands of a single
boss.
In the only case of national-level boss rule, long-
time president (1966-86) Ferdinand Marcos over-
came these obstacles under national conditions
roughly analogous to those which have allowed
bosses to entrench themselves at the local level. In
the mid-1960s, the increasing availability of foreign
loans and assistance programmes, necessity for
national state intervention in 'development', and
dependence of the oligarchy on government loans
and special incentives allowed Marcos in his first
term (1966-69) to extend presidential prerogatives
to unprecedented supervisory powers over national
law-enforcement and military agencies and unpar-
alleled regulatory powers over the national econ-
omy Benefiting also from the importance of
Philippine air and naval bases to the American war
effort in Indochina and the support of the Nixon
Administration, Marcos won re-election in 1969
and, with American blessings, abolished Congress
and declared martial law in 1972. Ruling hence-
forth by decree, Marcos centralized a national police
under the Armed Forces, established quasi-govern-
mental monopolies for major commodity exports,
and parcelled out regulatory and proprietary con-
trol over the other 'commanding heights' of the
national economy - banking, construction, energy,
media, ports, telecommunications and transporta-
tion - among a close circle of family members,
cronies, and froritmen. Only in the mid-1980s,
when the world recession and the ensuing domestic
financial crisis led to government bankruptcy and
threatened American withdrawal of support, did
Marcos' national boss rule begin to unravel. Overly
reliant on office-based resources and unable to
establish a firm economic base independent of the
state, Marcos, like many small-town and provincial
bosses, was unable to withstand the hostile inter-
vention of a superordinate power (i.e. the U.S.) and
to pass on his bailiwick to successive generations in
classic dynasty form.
Since the fall of Marcos in 1986 and the subsequent
reestablishment of regular, competitive local, con-
gressional and presidential elections in the
Philippines, the process commonly known as
'democratization' has seen the reflowering of local
bossism throughout the archipelago. Pork barrel
and patronage appointments have, to a large extent,
reverted to congressional hands, a Philippine
National Police firmly subordinated to legislative
and local executive authority has replaced the
Marcos-era Philippine Constabulary/Integrated
National Police, and a new local government code
has restored - and indeed strengthened - the pre-
rogatives of municipal mayors and provincial gov-
ernors over local agencies and resources of the state
apparatus. Given the manifold spoils of these mul-
titudinous offices, elections have been fiercely con-
tested, through machine mobilization, vote-buying,
fraud, manipulation, and violence. Small wonder
that much recent journalistic and scholarly research
has focused on 'bosses', 'political clans', 'dynasties',
and 'warlords'.
Meanwhile, however, significant changes are clearly
observable in the post-Marcos manifestations of
bossism in the Philippines. New election laws, for
example, have eliminated the pre-martial law
inclusion of two political parties in the vote-count-
ing process, thereby upsetting the established
2 In the Senate, the sole exception to this rule is Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, the successful corporate lawyer who
served in successive Marcos administrations, primarily as
Minister of Defense, and thereby amassed an empire in
coconut processing and wood products that he has
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pattern of two-party competition (characteristic of
presidentialism) and undermining party alignments
and loyalties in general. Political parties are thus
institutionally far weaker today in the Philippines
than they were in the 1950s or 1960s. At the
national level, moreover, the withdrawal of
American military facilities, the end of the Cold
War, and the wariness of foreign creditors and
donors towards authoritarian ètatisme have com-
bined with the domestic trends noted above to
limit the possibilities for another Marcos-like figure
to emerge.
More importantly perhaps, a subtle change in the
linkage between 'business' and 'politics' is currently
under way in the Philippines. In several provinces
where suburban industrial and commercial growth
is most pronounced, local bosses have abandoned
efforts at local empire-building in favour of broker-
age services for Manila-based or foreign capital,
winning lucrative construction and real-estate deals
but skimming only percentages (for permits, zoning
ordinances, and union-busting services) on new
golf courses, industrial estates, and residential
subdivisions. Some major illegal rackets (e.g. nar-
cotics) are similarly centralized and international-
ized, leaving local bosses to serve merely as
franchise dealers or recruiters for urban-based and
foreign syndicates. In the House of Representatives,
well established plantation owners and logging con-
cessionaires now rub shoulders with commercial
bankers, real-estate moguls, and shipping magnates
far more interested in the overall healthy of the
domestic economy whilst the nationally elected
Senate is packed with corporate lawyers, media
personalities, machine politicians and well-heeled
fixers - rather than the sugar barons and industrial
tycoons of yesteryear. Whilst Manila's top magnates
reap considerable benefits for their campaign con-
tributions, today not a single major conglomerate
is in fact directly represented in the national legis-
lature, a striking contrast with the senatorial rolls of
the pre-Marcos era, or, for that matter, the parlia-
ment in contemporary Thailand.2
converted into a network of real-estate and investment
holding companies. In the House of Representatives,
scions and sons-in-law of several prominent
industrialists also hold seats.
4 Conclusion
As the preceding analysis has suggested, one of the
primary consequences of 'democratization' in
Thailand and the Philippines since the mid-1980s
has been the re-flowering of 'bossism in numerous
localities in these two countries. The common
manifestations of bossism in Thailand and the
'Philippines - the electoral and economic entrench-
ment of powerbrokers with virtually monopolistic
control over entire localities - reflect a decisive
change in the nature of their states, namely the
subordination of their apparatuses to elected
officials, rather than essential features of these
two very different societies as the conventional
wisdom on 'local strongmen' would have us believe
(Migdal 1988). Elsewhere in South East Asia, cen-
tralized single-party machines (e.g. UMNO in
Malaysia) and military apparatuses (e.g. ABRI in
Indonesia) have encapsulated local gangsters and
magnates within sharply delimited realms of influ-
ence and power. We have shown how the differing
institutional structure of the state and timing of
'democratization' vis-ä-vis capitalist development
have accounted for the peculiar variations of
bossism found in Thailand and the Philippines,
namely reg(on-wide chao pho and gangster-banker
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